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State-Building, Stability,
and Oil as “Shared
Competencies” in Iraq
TRACI L. NELSON
Introduction

D

espite the democratic and developmental progress made in Iraq, the
state’s key ethnic, sectarian, and political groups have yet to achieve
consensus on core issues, including the division of oil wealth and resolutions
to territory disputes in Khanaqin and Kirkuk. Control of Kirkuk represents
control over one of two major oil producing regions in Iraq and, thus, control
over a substantial amount of wealth from the surrounding region’s oil development. Moreover, tensions between the leadership within the Government
of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) demonstrate that progress on issues such as these is critical to achieving a stable,
secure Iraq that is not merely a short-term phenomenon. These tensions
are exacerbated by the inability of the Council of Representatives (COR)
to pass a set of hydrocarbon laws that clarify oil and gas policies as well
as related management procedures, constitutional amendments, and other
investment laws.1 The short history of Iraq’s nascent, democratically elected
government has shown that legislation passed by the COR sometimes fails
to be implemented. Even worse, a meddlesome executive is occasionally
wont to tinker with legislation already passed or, in extreme cases, quash it
altogether. These actions only serve to degrade a legislative process that is
beset with indecision and institutional delays most recently associated with
the certification of the 2010 election results and the protracted government
formation process. As of October 2010, the four hydrocarbon laws that were
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introduced in the COR in 2007 have been neither finalized nor signed into
law. The discord regarding hydrocarbon legislation is, arguably, driven by
competing regional interests and exacerbated by the asymmetrical constitutional division of powers and weak institutions that exist at the federal,
regional, and gubernatorial levels. Blanchard notes:
Concurrent negotiations regarding constitutional amendments have
had direct implications for the hydrocarbon legislation debate, particularly efforts to clarify the specific authorities granted to federal and
regional governments to regulate oil and gas development and export
activities under Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi Constitution . . . violence and political tension that have prevailed in Iraq in recent years
have not been conducive to careful consideration of detailed hydrocarbon sector legislation or new national oil and natural gas contracts.2

The focus of this analysis on intergovernmental control over the oil
and gas industry is deliberate—Iraq has the world’s fourth largest oil reserves,
and its primary economic challenges are complicated by weak institutions
and persistent stability and security concerns.3 While oil and gas are part
of Iraq’s economic policy, each is not treated as such in the Constitution,
Provincial Powers Law of 2008, or the draft oil and gas laws. Understanding
oil as such is critical, because qualitative and quantitative studies suggest
that a state’s oil resources can have antidemocratic effects, rentier effects,4
repression effects,5 and modernization effects.6 Regardless of the structure
of the government it may very well place at risk state-building, stability, and
democratic consolidation given the lack of economic development often
associated with resource wealth.7 When tying these effects together, existing
research suggests that states like Iraq face a “resource curse” wherein the
greater the state’s resource wealth, the more slowly the state develops, the
greater the instability, and the more likely it is to experience civil war.8
Decision-makers in Iraq are faced with overcoming these effects and
the constitutional dilution of the GOI’s federal authority, specifically with
respect to the regulation of the oil and gas industry and its resources. The
division of powers related to oil as a “shared competency” of the federal,
regional, and provincial governments has the potential to lead to negotiation
gridlock across these government levels and result in the continued promotion of alternative markets for the sale and export or trafficking of oil not
regulated by the government. Here, a decentralized approach allows decision-makers to search for extraconstitutional mechanisms to enforce their
preferences. The lack of structure or specific powers in the Constitution,
enabling the GOI to regulate the oil and gas industry, is problematic for the
overall physical security and economic, legal, and political stability of Iraq.
Given this in particular, the intergovernmental relationships that develop
are likely to determine the extent to which democratic consolidation takes
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hold in Iraq. Moreover, if gridlock results and alternative markets persist,
the people of Iraq are likely to perceive the government as unstable and an
illegitimate functionary to manage
the state’s wealth, particularly
where oil wealth is being diverted The greater the state’s resource
wealth, . . . the more likely it
from providing basic services to
is to experience civil war.
the Iraqi people.9 This article is
not intended to be a treatise on
these issues but rather a beginning to a discussion that connects previously
disjointed concerns; the outcome of which carries with it high stakes for the
people of Iraq and directly affects Iraq’s relationship with the United States.
Constitutional Division of Powers and the Provincial Powers Act
The Iraqi Constitution does not delineate the structure or necessary
prerequisites required to manage the relationships between the burgeoning
institutions at the federal, regional, and provincial levels of Iraq’s government. To this end, the Constitution contains an exceptionally large number
of provisions that defer decision-making to the direct enactment of some
future law passed by the COR or other legislative body. In some cases, these
future laws have to be passed by a two-thirds COR majority. Likewise, many
of the provisions use discretionary language (may) as opposed to mandatory
language (shall) to direct the COR. Only one of the fifty-four undefined
provisions carries with it a timeline by which the COR or other legislative
body needs to provide clarification.10 On the one hand, the Constitution’s
general lack of specificity permits the GOI and its institutions to take shape
as the Constitution evolves.11 On the other, decentralized decision-making
coupled with the lack of constitutional clarity as to the ownership of the
oil and gas industry suggests that Iraq is subject to resource wealth effects
and the “resource curse.”12 While the Constitution charges the federal government in Section IV, Article 109 with preserving the “unity, integrity,
independence, and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal democratic system,”
it contains articles that confound the federal government’s ability to satisfy
these goals.
The Iraqi Constitution establishes three levels of governance—the
federal government in Baghdad, regional governments of which there is
currently only one, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the governorates (provinces) of
which there are eighteen.13 It also specifies that “[o]il and gas are owned by
all of the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.” This provision
in Article 111 gives all citizens of Iraq, wherever a resident, an undivided
interest in all of the country’s oil and gas resources. It neither vests ownership of oil and gas in the federal government nor allocates the resources to
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particular regions or governorates. By its language and separation from the
exclusive authorities of the federal government and the shared authorities,
Article 111 suggests that oil and gas are, at a minimum, a shared competency.14 The language of Articles 112 and 113 support this conclusion.15
Despite these articles, the Constitution does not recognize the shared
ownership of presently identified oil fields or those identified after 2005.
Articles 112 and 113 specify neither how or by whom oil and gas will be
managed nor how its revenues will be distributed. The administration of
strategic policies necessary to develop the oil and gas industry requires, at
a minimum, legislation to clarify issues related to the shared ownership of
this industry. Because subsequent regulations will be statutory as opposed to
constitutional amendments, we should expect political pressure will persist,
influencing the law, its implementation, and enforcement. Accordingly,
forthcoming negotiations regarding the lack of ownership structure given
to present and future oil fields and the distribution of revenues are likely to
exacerbate instability and the GOI’s ability to legislate matters related to the
oil industry at the federal level.
Attention to these negotiations as potential drivers of instability
is important, because Article 121 allows the regional powers to exercise
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, “except for those authorities
stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government.” Oil is
not part of exclusive authorities of the federal government; it is a shared
competency. The constitutional devolution of powers to the regional and provincial governments compromises the federal powers necessary to manage
Iraq’s resource wealth.16
Complicating intergovernmental relationships are issues tangential
to the management and distribution of oil and its revenue. These include:
customs, environmental policy, and formulating development and general
planning policies. All are listed in Iraq’s Constitution as shared competencies
of the federal, regional, and provincial governments. It is unclear whether
the Constitution gives priority to Article 110 or 114. A strict reading of the
Constitution suggests that where conflict among the federal, regional, or
provincial governments exists, Article 115 will supersede and give priority
to the decision-making bodies of the regional and provincial governments.
Clarifying these issues is critical to Iraq’s stability and the management of
the oil industry and its revenues. Recent failure of the COR to pass amendments to the Constitution or legislation affecting oil and revenue sharing that
address the inconsistencies previously outlined puts additional pressure on
the incoming COR to resolve these matters in such a way that the populace
and other interested parties assume defensive postures leading to instability.
Given the lack of clarity of the provincial powers in the Constitution,
the COR passed the Law of Governorates not Incorporated into a Region
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(Provincial Powers Law) of 2008.17 The Provincial Powers Law transfers
additional authority from the federal level to the provincial councils and
governors, including power to approve provincial budgets, adopt legislation,
nominate and dismiss senior officials, and direct non-federal security forces.
The law also grants the COR and the Council of Ministers the power to remove
provincial governors and senior officials and dissolve provincial councils.
These changes are important to our understanding of how these governments will develop and claim constitutional and legal powers that may
impede the federal centrality necessary to manage the oil and gas industry.
The enactment of the Provincial Powers Law grants the provinces significant
authority not previously recognized by the GOI. Exercise of this power may
result in procedural challenges, because this approach will likely conflict
with an interpretation of the Constitution or existing legislation that views
the provinces and governorates as administrative units of the federal government. The power delegated to the provinces is likely to affect stability
in Iraq, particularly when provincial governments begin asserting power or
experience internal conflict due to political or ethno-sectarian differences.18
This assertion of power is likely to increase tensions between the GOI and
provinces as the powers of each are negotiated. Given the potential for constitutional, legal, and legislative challenges to the exercise of such power,
the absence of structure increases the probability of renewed conflict over
how power sharing is defined, thus affecting the oil industry.
Shared Powers Regarding Oil and Natural Resources
The lack of extant legislation to clarify the relationship of the different levels of government on issues of oil and gas is likely to perpetuate
existing instability and regional tensions, leading to negotiation gridlock
at every level of government. This may result in a vacuum that promotes
alternative markets for the sale and export or trafficking of oil not regulated by government entities. Accordingly, we should expect that where
Iraqi decision-makers are unable to compromise without sacrificing core
goals and interests, they will adopt uncompromising attitudes and positions.
These positions may only support the constitutional or legislative provisions
and related institutions that best protect the decision-makers’ core interests,
while rejecting accommodations that could be a viable alternative. At the
institutional and individual level these core objectives and interests include,
but are not limited to, providing basic services or control over geographic
areas and lucrative industries, such as Iraq’s oil and gas production. This
article was developed at the very time the North Oil Company announced
the discovery of approximately 40 unexploited oil wells in the Hanrin area
and the Iraqi Ministry of Oil (MOO) called for increased commissions to

Autumn 2010

5

Traci L. Nelson

owners of gas and kerosene filling stations, multiple rounds of licensing auctions, and worked directly with the Kuwait Oil Company on the exploitation
of border oil fields. Concurrently, the South Oil Company moved forward
with plans to allow foreign firms to start developing the Al Gharrah Oil
Field in late 2010. At the provincial level, the Dhi Qar Council announced
it is drafting a plan for disbursing oil revenues earned by the province in the
absence of controlling federal legislation.
The current instability, a direct result of intergovernmental tension,
has resulted in a lack of accommodation and an inability to compromise given the high stakes associated with the oil industry as evidenced
by the fact that:
• No compromise has yet been reached in the nearly four years that
the COR has been reviewing four separate pieces of oil and gas legislation
introduced in 2007.
• Heightened international participation and interest in entering into
oil contracts has forced the COR to deal with oil and gas revenue distribution through the budgetary process, leaving many decisions to the MOO,
which has made little progress in improving oil infrastructure.
• Underneath all of this is a constitutional and legislative structure that
cedes power to the regional and local governments that are, in many ways, not
fully equipped with the technical competence to manage the oil industry.19
To this end, Mahdi notes “the appropriation of community representation
[envisioned by the Constitution]—whether in the form of unwritten rules or
in sectarian balances . . . are forms of power and authority that are not conducive to transparency and accountability.”20 Persistence of this approach is
problematic for building a stable, secure Iraq.
The ownership structure of Iraq’s oil and revenue is necessarily part
of Iraq’s federal economic policy—despite the fact that the Constitution,
existing legislation, and draft oil and gas laws do not support it in this way.21
Arguably, “the future of democracy depends on the future of economic
development in Iraq . . . obstacles to economic development are obstacles
to the expansion of democracy.”22 It is critical that the oil and gas industry be
totally integrated into the federal economy beyond mere financial contributions. To effectively accomplish this, federal oversight and management of
the industry is requisite. Because the Constitution and draft oil and gas laws
do not establish the oil industry as a federally-based entity and are purposely
weak on the economic rationale for not doing so, one would expect that
ethno-sectarian, economic, and political preferences will further serve to
solidify regional and provincial control over the oil and gas industry, its
resources, and its revenue stream.
History suggests that this has been precisely the case—“control
over oil and its integration into the economy have led to instability, regional
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tensions, and foreign intervention.”23 The Iraqi oil industry was largely
managed by private contracts during Iraq’s anticolonial struggle, which
gave birth to the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).24 After the British-installed
monarchy was overthrown, the GOI passed Law No. 80 in 1961, which
nationalized unexploited oil reserves, leaving the IPC intact but limiting
its control to 0.5 percent of the industry. Law No. 80 permitted the state
to exploit oil in all areas outside those specified for the IPC.25 After full
nationalization of the oil industry, the 1970s witnessed an increase in production and export capacity, along with expanded exploration and refining
capabilities.26 Development of the industry continued in earnest until Iraq’s
attack on Iran in 1980. Nearly a decade of war caused Iraq’s oil industry to
suffer. It suffered even more following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the
resulting international sanctions levied in the 1990s. As a means to recover
from all this instability, the proposed oil and gas laws drafted in February
2007 gave exploration and planning responsibilities to a newly created
federal oil and gas council, designating the exploration responsibilities to
the state-run Iraq National Oil Company (INOC). Precise mechanisms for
how the INOC, a currently inactive state entity, would manage Iraq’s oil
reserves are included in separate legislation, also languishing in the COR.27
Gridlock on these issues is expected to continue because the Constitution
cedes broad power to the regional and provincial levels and fails to clearly
define oil and gas as a federal entity. The real challenge is the fact that the
proposed oil and gas legislation is aimed at developing a powerful federal
entity to manage the oil industry.
One potential avenue for increasing stability in the management,
income, and ongoing operations of the exploitation of Iraq’s oil and gas
revenue would be full or partial privatization of the extraction, refinement,
and transshipment of these resources.28 Privatization and a concurrent
reconfiguration of revenue streams from oil and gas resources (trust funds,
dedicated [statutorily mandated] public service projects, etc.) could help
stave off manifestations of the rentier effect and make the handling and
disposition of natural resource wealth more transparent and accountable at
every level of government.
Not surprising, perhaps, the unresolved disputes that have stalled
political decision-making related to oil and gas legislation center on the
power allocated to regional government versus that centralized in the federal
government. The majority focus on the terms and extent of foreign participation in oil and gas production and the development of future fields, along
with myriad formulae for revenue sharing. Specifically, these disagreements
include the KRG’s desire to control its own oil resources and restrict the
power of the MOO, disputes regarding security in areas inhabited by Kurds,
and the Kurds’ claim that the province of Kirkuk be formally integrated
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into the KRG.29 Opposition to the proposed oil and gas law is not, however,
confined to Kurdistan. Sunnis dominate the areas of Iraq that have limited
oil or gas deposits and thus generally favor centralized control of oil revenues. In southern Iraq, the Shia generally argue for localized rather than
centralized control to ensure that the people in the South retain control of
that oil producing region and are proportionally compensated. Also in the
south, oil field managers and workers’ unions affiliated with the Federation
of Oil Unions have threatened to strike if the law eventually passes, due
mainly to the fact that implementation of the law would cede control of
Iraqi’s oil wealth to foreign entities.30 These tensions are exacerbated as
the GOI and KRG enter into contracts with foreign entities related to the
development and export of oil. Tensions also persist because the GOI and
KRG argue that the contracts into which the other has entered are illegal
and invalid. Even Muqtada al-Sadr has demanded the government renegotiate the “illegal” contracts from 2009, since the COR did not ratify them.31
Saleh al-Muhammadawi, a leading official in Sadr’s movement, argues that
the Iraqi MOO “exceeded its powers and acted beyond its legal authority”
in executing these contracts.32 This assertion is factually correct given the
absence of oil and gas legislation and the unclear scope and reach of the
MOO’s contractual authority. Here, the lack of an institutional structure
to remedy such disputes, persisting tensions, and threat of strikes directly
impact the infrastructure of the oil industry and increase the viability of
underground markets, which present security risks for existing oil fields and
pipelines. All of these actions erode the economy and threaten development.
Stalled decision-making at the federal level directly affects decisionmaking at the regional and provincial levels. Because the COR has been
unable to reach a political compromise on oil and gas legislation in nearly
four years, the GOI and KRG have moved forward with production and
development contracts. This precedent may lead provincial governments
to do the same given their increased powers under the Constitution and the
Provincial Powers Act. This is problematic for a great number of reasons.
To begin, the provincial governments and, to a much lesser extent, the GOI
and KRG do not possess the technical competence to manage their own
oil operations or effectively negotiate international contracts for production
and development. To the latter point, Mahdi argues:
Favorable [contractual] terms are extremely unlikely to materialize
absent sovereignty and stability, particularly as political and security
risks are reflected in the contracts . . . . Pooling resources nationally
is not only more effective managerially, but more conducive to informed public participation in a highly technical area, and therefore
aids transparency.33

8Parameters

State-Building, Stability, and Oil as “Shared Competencies” in Iraq

While some contend that devolving control of the oil industry to the
regional and provincial levels increases individual access to information
consistent with democratic principles, this argument assumes information
is being shared, decisions are transparent, and technical expertise exists
to strategically manage these resources. Devolving control over the oil
and gas industry to the regional and provincial levels opens the oil sector
to unchecked decision-making and international involvement that may
increase local conflicts over resources and foster instability. Local control
may also exacerbate oil smuggling and the proliferation of alternative
markets, thereby allowing insurgent groups continued access to the revenue
generated by the oil and gas industry. Each reason emphasizes the need for
the effective management of the oil and gas industry, its resources, and its
revenue with federal centrality.
Although increased powers are granted to the regional and provincial levels, the broad implications of the oil and gas industry’s economic
and environmental effects suggest it may be difficult to secure an outcome
that is beneficial for the Iraqi people when regional and local plans are not
coordinated with the federal blueprint. Mahdi suggests that elements of the
oil and gas industry like “pipelines, terminals, storage depots, and ancillary
services are shared assets, . . . [but] these shared facilities require largescale and long-term investment[s], more likely undertaken by a regulated
state monopoly.”34 The Constitution notes exclusive federal control over
commerce and defines customs, environmental policy, development formulations, and general planning policies as shared competencies.35 How these
integrate to support the economy and oil and gas industry remains unclear
and on unstable footing.
As different levels of government compete for power and a share
of the oil industry, negotiation gridlock like the one experienced in the
COR is likely to promote alternative markets for the sale, export, and trafficking of unregulated oil at every government level. Alternative markets
divert resources from the domestic market; it is these unregulated markets
that leave Iraqis with few choices. Authors Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and
McCorriston espouse the belief that improvements in the quality of government institutions possessing legal and structural specificity reduce the
presence of what they term the “shadow economy” or alternative markets.
The lack of institutional quality—bureaucracy, regulatory discretion, rule
of law, corruption, and a weak legal system—drive economic agents to
support alternative markets and develop underground economies.36 This is
certainly the case when the government is not sufficiently constrained by
its constitution. Iraq, while improving, has a weak legal structure, unstable
and immature institutions, and an alternative market in oil and gas that
are driven by a protracted government formation process, an absence of
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adequate legislation, and structural asymmetry of governmental powers
as defined by the Constitution; all of which directly impact the ability of
institutions to function effectively.
Building a Stable State
Cultural and political institutions and their development are critical
to the future of Iraq. At the individual level, institutions influence societal and
cultural norms, beliefs, and actions, shaping governmental and individual
outcomes.37 The form and function of governmental institutions “depend on
the conditions under which they emerge and endure.”38 To this end, political
scientists and economists agree that: “leaders in mineral-rich states fail to
build viable institutions that are crucial for fostering state capacity, democratic regimes, and long-term economic growth.” They also agree it is the
presence of these weak or immature institutions, particularly regulatory or
fiscal institutions, that are the critical link between “resource wealth and the
countless negative economic and political outcomes attributed to it.”39 The
lack of clarity regarding the intergovernmental relationships responsible
for the control of the oil and gas industry directly impacts the instability
and institutional weakness. Authors Luong and Weinthal note that much
of the research on the “resource curse” that follows oil wealth ignores “an
intermediary cause of institutional weakness—the structure of ownership over mineral resources, or who owns and controls the development
of these resources—that is rooted not in resource wealth per se but in the
domestic conditions that precede resource development.”40 These domestic
conditions, covered in the previous section, include decades of distrust of
a noninclusive, discriminatory government whose economic development
was deterred by internal and external forces.
In a comparatively short time, Iraq has begun to recognize that
deep sociocultural divisions like the ethno-sectarian identities present in
the country today constitute, in a number of cases, the greatest threat to
democracy. David Waldner argues that:
The lesson for institutional engineers is that divided societies can best
secure democracy if institutions encourage grand coalitions uniting
cohesive political parties representing distinct cultural blocs. Stability
is reached because representatives of all the major societal groups
participate in decision making while each group retains autonomy in
sub-national affairs.41

This approach is supported by three phases:
• A compromise wherein parties denounce militancy and begin the
constitutional drafting process.
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• A crafting wherein decision-makers enter into negotiations,
select the governing institutions, and oversee the implementation of those
institutions.
• The consolidation phase where these institutions establish and
enforce democratic order.42
Iraq has successfully completed the first stage but has faced major challenges in moving to stages two and three. The prime examples of this failure
are the linked intergovernmental relationships and oil and gas regulations,
failures created by the structural asymmetry built into the Constitution and
executed in phase one. It was COR’s failure to successfully negotiate the
terms of legislation related to oil and gas in phase two that remains a major
obstacle. Waldner analyzes a process tracking model that supports this conclusion. He notes that in Iraq:
It becomes clear that the drafting of the Constitution and the selection of electoral institutions have not been a mechanism for conflict
resolution and accommodation: they have been instruments for intercommunal competition and conflict. The [divisions] within Iraqi
society and polity have driven the process of institutional selection.
That institutional engineering has failed simply reflects these underlying conflicts.43

While the arguments presented in this article identify the benefits
of centralized control, they do not suggest an all-or-nothing centralized or
localized approach to the management of the oil and gas industry. Rather, the
structural asymmetry of the Iraqi Constitution, devolution of governmental
powers via the Provincial Powers Act, and lack of extant hydrocarbons
legislation that defines the relationships between the federal, regional, and
provincial governments present a protracted challenge for Iraq that may
ultimately threaten the state’s short- and long-term stability while eroding
economic development. The lack of specific laws or regulations outlining
the ownership of oil and gas has permitted Iraqi decision-makers at the
federal, regional, and provincial levels to make decisions consistent with
their core goals and interests. The result is a lack of compromise on core
issues, further complicated by constitutional and legislative provisions that
are selectively applied, the stalling of hydrocarbons legislation in the COR,
and the rejection of any accommodation as a possible solution. It matters
not that Iraq has a structurally asymmetric constitution and problems associated with the devolution of powers; these are facts with which GOI must
deal and to which it and the United States must find durable solutions. It
does matter how these issues are resolved, because each directly affects
the state, regions, and provinces, as well as the government’s ability to
structure resource wealth in such a manner as to provide for basic services
and generate economic development.
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Iraq’s inability to successfully exploit and manage its resource
wealth has contributed directly to the sluggish pace of building and replacing infrastructure for public utilities. In many parts of Iraq, the availability
of electricity from the national grid as well as water and sewer services is at
or below Saddam Hussein-era levels. And no government in Iraq’s modern
history has been able to properly manage its scarce, but potentially adequate
water resources. Water and electricity are critical elements utilized in the
extraction of oil. Additionally, a sufficient and dependable supply of electricity is required to power pipelines and refineries. In an unfortunate reverse,
Iraq’s lack of coal, nuclear power, or hydropower leave oil as the mainstay
in the production of electrical power. But the country’s antiquated refining
capabilities, coupled with an ever-increasing domestic demand, leave it a
net importer of refined petroleum products. Among the many contributing
factors to low levels of electricity production have been the continual shortfalls of MOO’s capacity to provide adequate (and mutually agreed upon)
supplies of gasoline and kerosene to the Ministry of Electricity. The government’s inability to provide a reasonable level of public services, particularly
electricity, has strained civil tranquility to its limit. In Basra, Iraq’s second
largest city, large demonstrations protesting the lack of electricity erupted
recently, with the police killing two of the demonstrators. Regardless of the
billions of dollars allotted and the seven years the government has had to
fix the problems, all of Iraq continues to suffer from a woefully inadequate
provision of public utilities—electricity perhaps being the most acute.
These facts provide additional evidence that the wealth of resources
associated with the oil industry has historically undermined democratic consolidation at every level of government. These include but are not limited
to the well-documented rentier, repression, and modernization effects of
resource wealth. The critical question facing GOI is how the state will
define the federal, regional, and provincial intergovernmental relationships,
consistent with the Constitution. Any such definition needs to reflect agreement by the critical players, so they can leverage the oil and gas issue in
their effort to stabilize the state and quell any underlying ethno-sectarian
and geographical tension. When the role of government is perceived as
transparent and the institutions charged with oversight of the oil and gas
industry are viewed as legitimate and representative of a stable state, an
environment in which alternative markets and the associated shadow oil
economy flourishes will be suppressed. In the absence of such actions;
however, we can expect the shared competency of oil and gas to persist in
fostering instability and negotiation gridlock across the federal, regional,
and provincial levels of government.
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